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Introduction 
The official announcement of the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defence 
Identification Zone
1
 and the announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea 
Air Defence Identification Zone
2
 by China in late November 2013 have caused considerable sensation 
as well as controversy in the international community. Generally speaking, under contemporary 
international law, there is no concrete treaty law governing the legal status of ADIZ. In fact, legal rules 
governing the establishment and operation of an ADIZ are mostly regulated by customary 
international law. The lack of an international treaty regime of the ADIZ and the relative flexibility of 
the customary international law inevitably lead to the current controversy on the establishment and 
operation of the Chinese ADIZ.  
In this short article, the author will make comments on three questions related to the 
establishment and operation of the Chinese ADIZ: What is the legal status of ADIZ in contemporary 
international law? Whether the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ conforms to the contemporary 
customary international law? Whether the Chinese aircraft identifications rules conform to the 
customary international law? The author will argue that the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ and 
the Chinese aircraft identification rules do not contravene customary international law. Even though 
some specific aircraft identification rules announced by China do not entirely accord with the current 
State practice, customary international law does not prohibit these rules. Moreover, the legality of 
these rules is also enhanced by the increasing recognition by other States.  
i. The Legal Status of ADIZ in Contemporary International Law 
According to one authoritative work on public international law, an Air Defence Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) can be defined as: 
a defined area of airspace within which civil aircraft are required to identify themselves. 
These zones are established above the exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’) or high seas 
adjacent to the coast, and over the territorial sea, internal waters, and land territory. ... An 
aircraft approaching national airspace can be required to identify itself while seaward 
thereof in international airspace as a condition of entry approval.
3
 
                                                          
1
 The official announcement was issued by the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China on 
23 November 2013. See ‘Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on Establishing the 
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’ (Xinhua News, 23 November 2013) 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm accessed 2 December 2013. Referred to 
as ‘Chinese ADIZ’ in the following text. 
2
 See ‘Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of 
the P.R.C.’ (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 23 November 2013) 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm  accessed 2 December 2013. Referred to 
as ‘Chinese aircraft identification rules’ in the following text. 
3
 JA Roach, ‘Air Defence Identification Zones’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) Vol I, 231, para 1. A similar definition has been proposed by Abeyratne. 
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Three important points can be inferred from the above definition of the ADIZ. In the first place, 
the function of the ADIZ is to be served as a buffer area for identifying those foreign aircrafts that 
approach the national airspace of a coastal State. Accordingly, the purpose of establishing an ADIZ is 
to provide precautionary measures for the protection of territorial sovereignty over national airspace of 
a State, as well as its national security.
4
 Secondly, though the definition seems to suggest that an 
ADIZ can be established over marine space as well as land territory, in fact, an ADIZ will be 
inconceivable without covering the relevant marine space adjacent to a coastal State (such as the 
internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ of that coastal State) or the high seas. It is worth noting that State 
practice also reveals that the ADIZ is exclusively established by coastal States only. By far, no land-
locked State has ever claimed an ADIZ. This very fact suggests that the relevant marine space of a 
coastal State are essential to the establishment and operation of an ADIZ. In the following analysis it 
can be revealed that States that have territorial disputes over marine space may also have disputes 
over their respective ADIZ. The third point is that an ADIZ is generally established and expanded 
outside the territorial airspace. As a result, the rights and duties of an aircraft that flies into this defined 
portion of international airspace may be affected by the establishment of the ADIZ.
5
 
As of today, there is no international treaty regime governing the establishment and operation 
of the ADIZ. Thus, international law concerning the ADIZ is largely, if not exclusively governed by 
customary international law.
6
 Arguably, the legal basis of establishing an ADIZ can be found in Article 
11 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 (the Chicago Convention)
7
 where it 
expressly endorses the right of a State to establish laws and regulations relating to ‘the admission to 
or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation’. It has been asserted 
by scholars that the ADIZ is the product of such kind of laws and regulations under Article 11. The 
justification for establishing an ADIZ outside the national airspace of a State is elaborated by 
Abeyratne. According to Abeyratne: 
ADIZs requirements act as conditions precedent that are calculated to ensure the 
protection of that State. The justification for ADIZ lies theoretically in the precautionary 
principle which asserts that the absence of empirical or scientific evidence should not 
preclude States from taking action to prevent a harm before it occurs.
8
 
Since the first ADIZ was established by the United States in 1950, several coastal States have 
established their respective ADIZs.
9
 It has been generally recognised by the international community 
and, as a matter of fact, the establishment and operation of these ADIZs have not been strongly 
objected by most other States in the neighbouring area. More importantly, foreign aircrafts flying 
through these ADIZs do obey the regulations and rules stipulated by those States. Therefore, it can 
be reasonably concluded that the establishment and operation of an ADIZ by coastal States have 
reached the threshold of forming customary international law, with both concrete State practice and 
opinio juris.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See R Abeyratne, ‘In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air Defence Identification Zones’ (2012) 5 Journal of 
Transportation Security 87. 
4
 See IL Head, ‘ADIZ, International Law, and Contiguous Airspace’ (1964) 3 Alberta Law Review 182, 183. 
5
 See ibid 184. 
6
 See Roach (n 3) para 5. It is worth mentioning that certain general principles of law may also play an important 
role in the contemporary legal regime of ADIZ.  
7
 The Convention was signed on 7 December 1944 and entered into force on 4 April 1947. 
8
 Abeyratne (n 3) 89. 
9
 See E Cuadra, ‘Air Defense Identification Zones: Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace’ (1977) 18 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 485, 492 and 509. See also Roach (n 3) para 5. 
10
 See ‘The Commander’s Handbook  on the Law of Naval Operations’ (NWP 1-14M, July 2007) section 2.7.2.3. 
See also Roach (n 3) para 5; Cuadra (n 9) 485. 
Yinan Bao Reflections on the Establishment of the Chinese Air Identification Zone 
IALS Student Law Review  | Volume 1, Issue 2, Spring 2014  | Page 8 
 
Before assessing the issues related to the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ, it is necessary 
to briefly summarise the essential customary international law rules regarding the establishment and 
operation of an ADIZ. First and foremost, a coastal State is entitled to establish an ADIZ above its 
land territory and marine space (internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ) as well as above the high seas. 
For airspace outside the territorial airspace of that coastal State (the airspace above the EEZ and the 
high seas), no State sovereignty will be generated. Nor will any sovereign rights be accorded. And so, 
it is obvious that the nature of this portion of airspace remains as international airspace.
11
 Secondly, 
with regard to the aircraft identification rules within the ADIZ, it is generally recognised that these rules 
shall only apply to aircraft that intend to enter into or depart from the territorial airspace of that coastal 
State.
12
 The aircraft shall identify themselves as well as filing their flight plans and position reports to 
the authorities of that coastal State. For aircraft merely flying through the ADIZ, these rules are 
generally not applicable.
13
 Thirdly, in peacetime and non-emergency circumstances, civil aircraft 
which fail to comply with the aircraft identification rules may be intercepted but not attacked.
14
 
ii. Reflections on the Issues regarding the Legitimacy of the Establishment of the Chinese 
ADIZ and the Chinese Aircraft Identification Rules 
The establishment of the East China Sea Air Identification Zone (the Chinese ADIZ) has 
raised controversy over its legality soon after the official announcement of the establishment and the 
announcement of the aircraft identification rules.
15
 The major controversy seems to be focused on the 
following three issues. First of all, the Chinese ADIZ covers not only over the Chinese marine space 
(its territorial waters and the adjacent part of EEZ) but also overlaps with the disputed marine space 
with Japan and South Korea, especially the highly disputed Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands).
16
 As a 
result, the Chinese ADIZ has overlapped with the Japanese and the South Korean ADIZ. Secondly, 
the aircraft identification rules issued by China infer that any aircraft entering its ADIZ shall abide by 
these rules.
17
 Such an implication means even for those aircraft flying through the ADIZ but not 
intending to enter the Chinese territorial airspace will also be subjected to the rules unilaterally set by 
China. Thirdly, according to the third point in the Chinese aircraft identification rules, the Chinese 
armed forces are authorised to adopt ‘defensive emergency measures’ to respond to aircraft that fail 
to comply with the aircraft identification rules.
18
 This point contains the slim possibility that foreign 
                                                          
11
 See Roach (n 3) para 1 and 2. 
12
 See ibid para 6. See also the United States Air Traffic and General Operating Rules (14 CFR 2003 Part 99), 
especially section 99.1a which specify the applicability of the rules limited to aircrafts operating in the United 
States or into, within or out of the United State through its ADIZ.  
13
 See Roach (n 3) para 6. 
14
 See ibid para 7-9. 
15
 For instance, see ‘Japan's PM Demands China Revoke Claim to Air Zone Over Disputed Islands’ (The 
Guardian, 25 November 2013)  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/25/japan-shinzo-abe-china-air-zone-
disputed-islands accessed 3 December 2013. See also ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular 
Press Conference on November 29, 2013’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 29 
November 2013) Question 8  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1104103.shtml accessed 3 December 
2013. 
16
 See ‘China establishes 'air-defence zone' over East China Sea’ (BBC News, 23 November 2013)  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25062525 accessed 3 December 2013. 
17
 See ‘Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 
of the P.R.C.’ (n 2). 
18
 See ibid. 
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aircraft might be intercepted or even shot down by Chinese armed forces should these aircraft fail 
voluntary identification.
19
 The following paragraphs will assess these three issues one by one. 
With regard to the first issue, as it has been pointed out above, the establishment of an ADIZ 
over marine space adjacent to a coastal State has already been accepted as customary international 
law. Thus, the real issue lies in whether the establishment of an ADIZ covering disputed marine space 
with other States contravenes customary international law rules. Above all, it can be pointed out that 
there is no specific rule in customary international law which prohibits the establishment of an ADIZ 
over disputed marine space. On the contrary, State practice reveals that it is not unusual for State to 
unilaterally establish or extend an ADIZ over disputed marine space. For instance, the Japanese 
ADIZ extension in 2010 covered a portion of the marine space disputed by Taiwan.
20
 In fact, the 
South Korea ADIZ also has overlapped with the Japanese ADIZ in disputed marine space. Moreover, 
after the Chinese announcement of the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ, South Korea has 
recently expanded its own ADIZ to overlap with the Chinese and the Japanese ADIZ.
21
 Thus, it is 
evidently that the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ State practice does not contravene customary 
international law. 
With regard to the second issue, it can be admitted that customary international law regarding 
the operation regulations and aircraft identification rules of the ADIZ normally only applies to foreign 
aircrafts that intend to enter the territorial airspace of the coastal State.
22
 The operation regulations 
and aircraft identification rules generally do not apply to foreign aircraft that merely fly through the 
ADIZ.
23
 The typical example is the practice of the United States. According to the US operational rules 
for the ADIZ: 
The United States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ 
procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United 
States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. airspace.
24
 
However, it is worth noting that China is not the first nation that requires any foreign aircraft flies into 
the ADIZ shall obey the aircraft identification rules. In fact, the past Canadian rules for ADIZ require 
                                                          
19
 See ‘Japan Takes Airspace Issue to U.N. Agency’ (The New York Times, 30 November 2013)  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/world/asia/japan-takes-airspace-issue-to-un-
agency.html?src=un&feedurl=http%3A%2F%2Fjson8.nytimes.com%2Fpages%2Fworld%2Fasia%2Findex.jsonp  
accessed 4 December 2013. 
20
 See ‘Ministry of Defense Extends the Air Defense Identification Zone, 26km West above Yonaguni Island’ (The 
Ryukyu Shimpo, 25 June, 2010)  http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-164039-storytopic-3.html  accessed 4 
December 2013. See also ‘Japan extends ADIZ into Taiwan space’ (Taipei Times, 26 June 2010) 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/2003476438 accessed 4 December 2013.  
21
 See ‘South Korea Declares Expanded ADIZ Overlapping with Other Zones’ (The Japan Times, 8 December 
2013)  http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/08/asia-pacific/south-korea-declares-expanded-adiz-
overlapping-with-other-zones/#.UqXcx43xvIU  accessed 9 December 2013. See also ‘South Korea Expands Own 
ADIZ’ (Taipei Times, 9 December 2013)  
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/12/09/2003578604 accessed 9 December 2013; ‘South 
Korea Expands Air Defense Zone Southward’ (Xihua News, 9 December 2013)  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-12/08/c_132951349.htm  accessed 9 December 2013. 
22
 See Roach (n 3) para 6. 
23
 See ibid. 
24
 ‘The Commander’s Handbook  on the Law of Naval Operations’ (n 10) section 2.7.2.3. 
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the same information not only from aircraft flying to Canada but as well from those which are flying 
elsewhere and which pass through the Zone en route.
25
 
Of particular importance is that the contemporary. Canadian Aviation Regulations still adopt a 
similar provision.
26
 Obviously, the Canadian practice has not been challenged by any other nations 
include the US. Considering the Canadian practice, it is unlikely that the Chinese rules should be 
seriously challenged by other States. 
With regard to the issue of the adoption of emergency defensive measures should a foreign 
aircraft fail to comply with the aircraft identification rules, it is generally recognised in customary 
international law as well as the Chicago Convention that a civil aircraft can be intercepted by airforce 
but not be attacked upon.
27
 Admittedly, the text of the third point of the aircraft identification rules of 
the Chinese ADIZ does not distinguish its application between civil and military aircraft. Nevertheless, 
it is rather inconceivable that a civil aircraft that fly into the ADIZ shall have any sensible reason not to 
‘cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions’. Besides, as it has been pointed out 
above, Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention has set the protection of civilian aircrafts as a priority 
and required State parties to refrain from using force against civilian aircrafts. China has ratified 
Article 3 bis in July 1997, one year before Article 3 bis entered into force in October 1998.
28
 Evidently, 
it is not correct to construe that the third point of the Chinese aircraft identification rules intends to 
authorise the Chinese airforce to use unnecessary force directly against foreign civilian aircrafts. With 
regard to foreign military aircrafts, the issue is quite different. As a matter of fact, neither customary 
international law nor the Chicago Convention proscribes the shooting down of a military aircraft that 
flies into an ADIZ.
29
 On the contrary, it has been pointed out by Roach that ‘in the case of imminent or 
actual hostilities, a State may find it necessary to take measures in self-defence that will affect 
overflight in international airspace’.
30
 In customary international law, a State is not prohibited from 
shooting down an incoming military aircraft in international airspace. Thus, even considering the 
extreme circumstance, the third point of the Chinese aircraft identification rules does not contravene 
customary international law.
 31
 
                                                          
25
 Head (n 4) 184. According to the Canadian Air Navigation Order (7 April 1961) section 11, ‘No person shall 
operate an  aircraft into or within a coastal CADIZ unless he has filed an IFR flight plan, a DVFR flight plan or a 
Defence flight notification with an appropriate air traffic control unit.’ Obviously, this provision applies to any 
aircraft entering the Canadian ADIZ. 
26
 See Canadian Aviation Regulations (SOR/96-433) section 602.145 (1). 
27
 See Roach (n 3) para 7. See also Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention. 
28
 See ‘Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 3 bis, Status 
as of 27 January 2012’  (ICAO)  http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/3bis_EN.pdf  accessed 
9 December 2013. 
29
 It should be noted that the Chicago Convention does not apply to military aircrafts. See Article 3 (a) and 3 (b) 
of the Chicago Convention. 
30
 Roach (n 3) para 9. 
31
 Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that even in emergent circumstances, the so-called ‘defensive 
emergency measures’ should be adopted with great caution and the intercepting fighter should endeavour to 
avoid any unnecessary use of force. Here one infamous incident is worth mentioning: On 3 July 1988 the Iran Air 
Flight 655 was mistakenly identified by the US Navy cruiser Vincennes as a hostile jet fighter and consequently 
shot down by the cruiser. The incident resulted in the death of 290 passengers and crew. See ‘US Warship 
Shoots Down Iranian Airliner’ (BBC News, 3 July 1988) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stm accessed 9 December 
2013. 
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Last but not least, it is well worth mentioning that since the announcement of the 
establishment of the Chinese ADIZ and the announcement of the Chinese aircraft identification rules, 
several States which had initially protested against the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ have 
instructed their commercial airlines to respect the Chinese ADIZ and comply with the Chinese aircraft 
identification rules.
32
 It is also reported that as of 5 December 2013, ‘55 airlines from 19 countries and 
3 regions have reported their flight plans to China’.
33
 Considering the sheer number of recognition of 
the Chinese ADIZ and the Chinese aircraft identification rules, their legality and acceptance by the 
international community are now of less doubt. 
Conclusion 
It can be recognised that in contemporary international law, the establishment and operation 
of ADIZs are regulated by customary international law. Under contemporary customary international 
law, a coastal State is entitled to unilaterally establish an ADIZ over marine space adjacent to its land 
territory. It can be seen from State practice that the establishment of an ADIZ covering disputed 
marine space is not prohibited by customary international law. Although the Chinese aircraft 
identification rules are not entirely in accord with State practice of other States, they are indeed not 
prohibited by customary international law. Furthermore, the increasing recognition and acceptance of 
the Chinese ADIZ and the Chinese aircraft identification rules also enhance their legality. Based on 
these points, it can be concluded that the recent establishment of the Chinese ADIZ and the 
announcement of the Chinese aircraft identification rules do not contravene customary international 
law. Its establishment and operation rules are well justified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 For instance, see ‘US Carriers Urged to Comply with China Air Zone Rules’ (BBC News, 30 November 2013) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25165503 accessed 6 December 2013;‘Japanese Airlines Say They Will 
Obey China’s Air Zone Rules Over Disputed Islands’ (South China Morning Post, 6 December 2013)  
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1366082/japanese-airlines-say-they-will-obey-chinas-air-zone-rules-
over-disputed  accessed 6 December 2013. 
33
 See ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on December 5, 2013’ (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 December 2013)  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1106014.shtml  accessed 6 December 2013. 
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